



On the determination of one's domicil depend several important
questions, as
1. The jurisdiction of the Surrogate and Probate Courts.
2. The right of exercising the elective franchise.
8. The liability to taxation and to military duty.
4. The jurisdiction of the Federal Courts as between citizens
of different states.
5. National character, for purposes of trade, and in case of war.
6. The disposition of the personal property of the deceased.
Says Chief Justice SHAw, in Abington vs. NZorth Bridgwater,
23 Pick. 170: c The fact of domicil is often one of the highest
importance to a person; it determines his civil and political rights
and privileges; it fixes his allegiance ; it determines his belligerent
and neutral character in time of war; it regulates his personal
and social relations whilst he lives, and furnishes the rule for the
disposition of his property when he dies."
There is the national and the dome8tic domicil. Upon the former
depends the law applicable to'the person and personal rights, that
.nvests him with a national character, and brings him under the
dominion of the law of nations. The latter fixes his location within
VOL. XI.-17 (257)
DOMICIL.
the state or nation, and upon it depend certain municipal privileges
and obligations, such as taxation, settlement, and voting; the juris-
diction of Surrogate and Probate Courts, and the ultimate disposi-
tion of one's personal property, when left undisposed of by will.
The two should, as far as possible, be assimilated to each other.
Much difficulty has been experienced in so defining the term
domicil as to meet with general acceptance. Bynkershoek declined
hazarding a definition. Yattel defined it to be , the habitation
fixed in any place, with an intention of always staying there ;"
but this has been complained of as too strict, if taken literally to
govern in a question relating to voting. Another considers it
synonymous with the word "home." Another able jurist, RusH,
in Guier vs. O'.Daniel, 1 Binney 349, defines it to be-, A resi-
dence at a particular place, accompanied with posztive or pre-
Pumptive proof of continuing it an unlimited time." All jurists
agree that where the domicil is not a necessary one, there must be
both intention and fact to constitute it-the fact of actual residence,
and the intention of continuing it for an indefinite period of time.
The first inquiry that .properly arises is whether certain terms,
such as dwelling, home, inhabitant, resident, are to be regarded as
synonymous with domicil, or in what respects they differ. The
words residence, habitation, and home have, in different cases, re-
ceived a different construction from that of domieil, as In the
matter of Thompson, 1 Wend. 48; In the matter of Wrigley, 4
Wend. 602, and -8 Id. 184; Exeter vs. Brighton, 15 Maine 58.
But all the distinctions thus taken depend less upon the words of
the statutes than the purposes contemplated ; and the term domicil
in reference to the same subjects would have received the same
construction. In some late cases, both in Massachusetts and New
Hampshire, the terms "resident," "inhabitant," "having a dwell-
ing or home," used in regard. to voting, the settlement of paupers,
and taxation, are declared to be synonymous with domicil, as un-
derstood at common law: Abington vs. North Bridgwater, 23 Pick.
170; Moore vs. Wilkins, 10 N. H. 452. -The same doctrine has
been substantially held in New Jersey and New York : The Stat.
vs. Ross, 8 Zabriskie 527 ; Crawford vs. Wilson, 4 Barb. Sup. Cu.
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Rep. 505 ;.and in lsham vs. Gibbons, 1 Bradford 70, it is said that
", these expressions should be construed in connection with the
matter to which they are applied."-
The next inquiry that presents itself relates to what may be
termed a necessary domicil, what it is, what its limitations, and its
effect. It is a domicil without the possibility of change. Its
limitations are the period of time during which the conditions
continue. Its effect is to require proof of change after the condi-
tions cease, or its further continuance is presumed. One instance
of a necessary domicil is found in the fact of minority. The domicil
of a legitimate unemancipated minor is that of his parents, or the
survivor of them, and changes with it. In The Sphool Directors vs.
James, 2 Watts & Sergeant 571, it is held that no infant who has
a parent, 8ui juris, can, in the nature of things, have a separate
domicil. His domicil must necessarily be that of his parent in
order to enable the latter to perform the duties which the law de-
volves upon him relating to the support, nurture, and education of
his children. The minor presumptively has no will, and can there-
fore have no intention while the condition of minority continues.
The parents' domicil is therefore necessarily and unavoidably that
of the child. The exceptions to this are,
1. Where the parents remove their domicil to a different place,
leaving the child permanently in the charge of another in the old
domicil. That other then stands in loco parentis, with the assent
of the parent.
2. Where the father has died, and the mother having remained
and gone away with her husband, has left the child behind in the
place of its birth. -The reason of this is that the mother, by mar-
rying again, has lost her old domicil and assumes that of her hus-
band, while that of the children of the first marriage remains
unaltered. A child does not take the domicil of his step-fathei,
or follow his mother's into it when she surrenders her own:
Brown vs. .Lynch, 2 Bradford 218.
Whether in case of the death of the parents the regularly ap.
pointed guardian has the power of changing the minor's domicil.
does not seem to be so clearly settled. The balance of authority,
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however, is in its favor: Holyoke vs. Karkins, 5 Pick. 20; Leeds
vs. Freeport, 1 Fairfield 856, 2 Kent's Com. 227, note.
Another instance of necessary domicil is that of a feme covert,
which follows that of her husband: Greene vs. Greene, 11 Pick.
4, 11, 14, 15. This condition, however, terminates with the reqson
upon which it rests. When the union between the two ceases, and
the one assumes an attitude of hostility against the other, a bill
being filed for a divorce, the domicils of each may be different:
.Harteau vs. .Harteau, 14 Pick. 181.
A student attending an institution of learning is not understood
to have thereby changed his domicil: 7 Mass. 1. So a lunatic or
person non compos mentis, being deprived of the power of forming
a rational intent, cannot change his domicil while that condition
continues, and the power of the committee, or guardian of a minor,
appears to be the same in imposing a domicil, as that of a parent.
It has been doubted whether under the civil law, ihe mother or
guardian could change the domicil of a minor whose father was
deceased, but as the former is, and the latter stands in loco parentis,
there seems at common law to be little doubt in relation to it.
A slave will necessarily follow the domicil" of his master, but a
servant who follows his master for a particular service is not thereby
understood to have lost his domicil of origin: Dalhousie vs.
MacDowall, 7 Clark & Finnelly 881.
Another instance of a necessary domicil is that of a public
officer, and if the office be conferred for the life of the holder,
and be irrevocable, the la* fixes his domicil in the places where its
functions are to be discharged, and admits of no proof to the con-
trary. But if the office be of a temporary and revocable nature,
the original domicil is not presumed to be changed. In reference
to the former we have the important case of Bruce vs. Bruce,
decided in the House of Lords, and reported in a note to Marsh
vs. Eutchinson, in 2 Bosanquet & Puller 219. It was here held that
as Mr. Bruce had entered into the India service, and not in the
king's service, he was bound to reside in India., and could not
reside elsewhere except by the leave of the Company, and, conse-
quently, for a temporary purpose. Similar points are also exten.
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sively discussed in Afunroe vs. Douglass, 5 Madd. 379, and in'
Craigie vs. Lewin, 3 Curteis' Ecclesiastical Rep. 435. In the case
first mentioned, it was held that persons who enter into the military
service of a foreign state, acquire the domicil of that state.
Neither public officers, as ambassadors, nor prisoners, lose their
original domicil by being resident or confined in foreign countries,
but an exile for life loses his original domicil. The emigrant who
leaves his country'with the view of finding for himself a new home,
loses his original domicil as soon as he locates in a new settlement,
but the fugitive from his country on account of civil war, is held
not to have lost his intention of. returning to it, and therefore still
retains his domicil in his native land. But the prisoner, exile, or
fugitive, may, by continuing to reside in a country after the coer-
cion has been withdrawn, and his power of choice being restored
to him, acquire a domicil therein. These points were much dis-
cussed in De Bonneval vs. De .Bonneval, 1 Curteis' Ecclesiastical
Rep. 856.
There are two kinds of domicil : 1st. Of origin. 2d. Of choice.
The great difficulty has generally arisen in determining between
these two ; or in other words, in determining whether in the given
case there has been a change of domicil. The domicil of origin is
usually the first established. In determining it, the fact of birth
is an item of evidence, but when standing alone is eatitled to but
little weight. In conjunction with the place of education and
bringing up it is important, and may turn the scale where the case
is in equilibrio, if it stands alone. The domicil of the parent
attaches to the child, and the necessary domicil becomes one of
origin. This presumptively continues until one of choice is estab-
lished. Among the criteria of domicil, therefore, properly ranks,
1. The place of residence. This is one of the first ingredients
in the constitution of domicil. In order, however, to entitle it to
much weight, it should be accompanied with some evidence of an
intention to continue it for an unlimited time. Intention may be
evidenced by declarations or by acts, and when once the design ot
permanent settlement is established, a domicil may be acquired by
the shortest residence. On the other hand, great length of timo
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will not of itself establish domicil, where the purpose was, and
continues to be, temporary. But thi does not preclude the transfer
of a residence originally temporary into one that is permanent.
growing out of the supervention of new views and purposes: Tho
Ship Ann Green, 1 Gallison 275.
Time of residence and intention are the two factors that mutually
contribute to constitute domicil. Neither of them will do it sepa-
rately, so that length of time alone will not make the change from
the old to the new residence. It is the union or concurrence both
of the intention and the fact of residence that will make out a
change of domicil: Collier vs. Bevar, 2 Ourteis 859. From a
very long residence, however, the- fact of intention to abandon his
former residence may be inferred, and this may become so strong
that the law will hardly receive declarations- to the contrary to
countervail it: Hoskins vs. ff-athews8 35 English Law and Equity
540. In Ennes vs. Smith, 14 How. U. S. Rep. 423, the court
lay down the doctrine that where a person lives is taken primd
facie to be his domicil, until other facts establish the contrary, and
unless there be some motive for that residence not inconsistent
with a clearly established intention to retain a permanent residence
in another place. And in The Harmony, 2 Robinson's Admiralty
Rep. 266, Lord STOWELL held that time is the grand ingredient in
constituting domicil. That it is to be taken in a compound ratio
of the time and the occupation, with a great preponderance of the
article of time. In regard to intention, it must be carried into
efect; thus in Bruce vs. Bruce, 2 Bosanquet & Puller 229, n.,
Bruce the decedent, originally a Scotchman, left Scotland in his
early years, went to India, returned to England for two years;
went again to India, lived there sixteen years, and died. Much
stress was laid on the fact that he meant to return to his native
sountry. The court allowed that to be granted; saying that he
meant then to change his domicil, but died before actually
changing it.
The question arises under place of residence whether it is a
man's dwelling-house or place of business, trade or occupation,
which is tc be regarded as his domicil; and as between the two it
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is his dwelling-house: Abington vs. ANorth Bridgwater, 28 Pick.
170. And if he has more than one dwelling-house, that in which
he sleeps, or passes his nights, will govern. And if the dwelling
is partly in one place, and partly in another, and it can be ascer-
tained where he habitually sleeps, that will determine the place of
his domicil.
2. Another criterion is the place of taxation or exercise of civil
rights. This, however, is not regarded as of much importance,
when standing alone. -The attempted exercise of the latter in a
single instance, in the case of a sailor, had little influence in the
case of Guier vs. O'Daniel, 1 Binney 349. But under other cir-
cumstances it was said in Stretton vs. Tiffin, 6 Howard 164, that
an exercise of the right of suffrage was conclusive.
3. Place of business or deposit of papers as a criterion. This
also is of little importance except in an equally balanced case, or
where the person whose domicil was in question, was a roving or
seafaring person. It was deemed unimportant in comparison with
the location of real property and of actual residence in Hoskins
vs. Matthews, 35 English Law and Equity 542.
4. Description in legal or other documents, or treatment by
official persons. This refers to the mode and place of which a
party may describe himself in deeds, wills, passports, or certificates
of stock ; his declarations or letters when no motive existed tc
falsify or deceive, as before suit brought, his place of payment of
taxes, the official records of public officers, such as. a register of
voters, service or the record of service of a notification, with other
declarations or acts of like kind, are criteria of domicil and admis-
sible evidence on the subject. Both declarations and letters of a
party, whose domicil is disputed, are admissible in evidence, espe-
cially if made previous to the event which gave rise to the suit:
Kilburn vs. Bennett, 3 Metcalf 199.
5. Location of property: Hoskin8 vs. Matthews, 35 English Law
and Equity 542. In this case this criterion was a good deal relied
upon An English ex-consul, living in part on a pension, had
purchased and resided in a villa near Florence. The court held
that the fact that this villa was the lh me of Mr. Matthews for a
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long time before his death, seemed to admit of no question. That
it was the place where he had set up his establishment, and in
which his fortune, so far as his fortune admitted of locality, was
centered.
6. Place of death. The place where a man is resident at the
time of his death is primd facie his place of domicil, and hence it
is incumbent on all those who deny it to repel the presumption
of law. Where, however, the party has a previously fixed domicil,
the circumstance of his dying elsewhere, affords only a slight pre-
sumption, and hence in Guier vs. O'JDaniel, 1 Binney 349, though
Guier, a seafaring man, died- abroad, his domicil was held to'be at
the place which was his domicil of origin.
7. Place of burial: Hood's Estate, 21 Penn. State Rep. 116.
No great weight can be attached to this as a mere fact. " A resi-
dence," as the court remark, "is established by acts while the
body and soul are united. When they are separated the question
of domicil is at an end. o disposition of the inanimate corpse
can affedt it; it is the previously expressed wish and desire as to
the place of burial that can give it any importance in a question
of domicil." * In Stanley vs. Bernes, 8 Haggard's Ecclesiastical
Reports 392, expressions of great strength in this respect were
made, and yet they were not held to countervail a residence of fifty
years in the place where he died. And yet there is no doubt in a
nearly equally balanced case a direction for burial in a person's
native country or place of original domicil, would be some evidence
of the mode in which he .himself regarded that country or'place,
and so far evidence of the party's domicil itself.
The remainder of what we have to say on the subject of domicil
may be included under the following maxims :
1. Every person must have a domicil somewhere. This is un-
doubtedly true so far as concerns the national domicil, as every
man must be considered subject to some law in regard to the dis-
position of his property upon his decease. The 10 Mass. 488,
holds that every qualified voter in the state must have a domicil
somewhere within the state, for the purpose of voting.
2. A person can have in law but one domicil for one and the
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same purpose. It may be conceded that different domicils may
exist for different purposes, as in Putnam vs. Jackson, 10 Mass.
488, in which it was said that the home of a citizen for the purpose
of voting might be in one place, and his legal settlement in another.
And in 1sham vs. G'bbons, 1 Bradford 70, it was held that although
there can be but one principal domicil for the distribution of per-
sonal property upon the decease of its owner, yet there might be
two or more domicils for different purposes. The case of Abington
vs. North .Bridgwater, 23 Pick. 170, however, strongly asserts and
maintains the doctrine that for the same purpose a man can have,
at one time, but one domicil.
3. A man's native domicil easily reverts. That is, if a native
citizen of one country by residing in a foreign country acquires a
domicil by residence, without renouncing his original allegiance,
his native domicil reverts the moment he puts himself in motion,
bond fide to quit the country, without any intention of returning.
The reason is that the law regards the foreign domicil as merely
adventitious, and de facto, and allows it to prevail only while it
continues actual and complete. The leading case that sustains this
maxim is that of White vs. Brown, 1 Wallace Jr. 217. This maxim
is limited to national domicil, and has no application in a question
between the domicil of origin and an acquired domicil, when both
are under the same sovereign jurisdiction. And in Monroe vs.
Douglass, 5 Maddock 379, in which a controversy arose between
the native domicil in Scotland, and a domicil of residence in India,
it was denied that there was any difference in principle between
the original domicil and an acquired domicil. In regard to vational
domicil, it seems to be settled that one is not extinguished by a
mere abandonment, but continues until a new one has been acquired ;
but where one domicil has been clearly abandoned, it would
strengthen the presumption that a new one. was acquired elsewhere,
and the succession to property would be governed by the law of
the old domicil until the acquisition of a new one. In a recent
case in the Supreme Court of Maine, Butterfield vs. Inhabitants of
Brooks, 2 American Law Register 785, N. S., it is held that a
domicil once acquired continues until a new one is gained, and
